Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2010

Does Terrorism Constitute a crime under International Law and, if
so, what is its definition. Specifically addressing the argument
that a limited definition of terrorism has emerged in customary
international law that provides for international criminal liability
for individual non-state actors.
Avrum Jacobson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jacobson, Avrum, "Does Terrorism Constitute a crime under International Law and, if so, what is its
definition. Specifically addressing the argument that a limited definition of terrorism has emerged in
customary international law that provides for international criminal liability for individual non-state
actors." (2010). War Crimes Memoranda. 65.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/65

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE: DOES TERRORISM CONSTITUTE A CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND, IF SO, WHAT IS
ITS DEFINITION

SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENT THAT A LIMITED DEFINITION OF TERRORISM HAS
EMERGED IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT PROVIDES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL NON-STATE ACTORS.
______________________________________________________________________________

Prepared by Avrum Jacobson
J.D. Candidate, May 2011
Spring Semester, 2010

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

8

A. Issue

8

B. Summary of Conclusions

8

1. Terrorism is a Crime Under International Law

8

2. Customary International Definition of the Crime of Terrorism

9

II. Factual Background

9

A. The Assassination

9

B. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon

10

C. The Suspects

12

III. Substantive Legal Definitions of Terrorism
A. Terrorism as a Trans-National Crime: Prohibited Acts

13
13

1. Terrorism Defined by Specific Acts: The Sectoral Framework
for Addressing Terrorism

13

2. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings:
A Terrorist Act’s Defining Features

17

3. Financing Treaty: Addressing Terrorism in General

19

B. Terrorism as a Discrete International Crime Rather Than Subset of International
Humanitarian Law or Human Rights Law

21

C. United Nations Resolutions Adopt Sectoral Treaty Obligations

24

D. Thematic Agreement but Conflicting Definitions

26

1. United Nations General Assembly Declaration

28
1

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
2. Regional Definitions of Terrorism by Persistent Objectors
E. Emerging Peacetime Consensus

29
31

1. Definitional Themes of Terrorism

32

2. Definition of the Crime of Terrorism

33

IV. Theories of Culpability

34

A. Individual Responsibility

34

B. Command Responsibility

34

C. Joint Criminal Enterprise

36

V. Conclusion

37

2

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Articles
1. Cyrille Begorre-Bret, Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization, and the Rule of Law: The
Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987 (2006).
2. Bruce Broomhall, State Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism From a Human
Rights Perspective, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 421, (2004).
3. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 Calif. L. Rev. 75 (2005).
4. Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes and International Co-Operation: Critical Remarks on
the Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes, 19
European Journal of International Law 533 (2008).
5. Catherine H. Gibson, Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine in the
ICTY: A Comparison of Individual Liability for Group Conduct in International and
Domestic Law, 8 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 521 (2008).
6. John P. Grant, Beyond the Montreal Convention, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 453 (2004).
7. Mohammed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism in the Muslim World: A
Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 221 (2008).
8. Sébastien Jodoin, Terrorism as a War Crime, 7 International Criminal Law Review 77
(2007).
9. Matthew Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 Lieden Journal
of International Law 139, (2000).
10. Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates
or Separate Offence of the Superior, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 619 (2007).
11. Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes:
Problems and Prospects, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 359 (2004).
12. Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 375 (2004)
3

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010

13. William S. Shepard, International Law and the War on Terrorism, 16 Mediterranean
Quarterly 79 (2005).
14. Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against its
Financing, 14 European Journal of International Law 365 (2003).
15. Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in
International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 23 (2006).
Books
16. Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed. Routledge-Cavendish
2003).
17. Tal Becker, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(Hart Publishing 2006).
18. Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. Oxford University Press 2008).
19. Ben Saul, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2006).
20. William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (3rd ed.
Cambridge University Press 2007).
Reports
21. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Report on the Eighth Session on the Assembly
of States Parties to the Rome Statute, January 2010,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/CICC_-_ASP_8_Report.pdf.
22. Coalition of Victims of Terrorism in the Basque Country, Terrorism, International Crime:
Proposed Amendment for the International Criminal Court’s Review Conference, 2009,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/TERRORISM_INTERNATIONAL_CRIME_C
OVITE.pdf.
23. U.N. G.A.O.R. 6th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 166, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9
(October 29, 2001) (prepared by Rohan Perera).

4

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
24. International Independent Investigation Commission, Report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1595, UN Doc. S/2005/662 (October 19, 2005) (prepared by Detlev Mehlis).
25. International Independent Investigation Commission, Second report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council Resolutions
1595 (2005) and 1636 (2005), UN Doc. S/2005/775 (December 12, 2005) (prepared by
Detlev Mehlis).
26. International Independent Investigation Commission, Third report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), UN Doc. S/2006/161 (March 14, 2006)
(prepared by Serge Brammertz).
27. International Independent Investigation Commission, Fourth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), UN Doc. S/2006/375 (June 10, 2006) (prepared
by Serge Brammertz).
28. International Independent Investigation Commission, Fifth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), UN Doc. S/2006/760 (September 25, 2006)
(prepared by Serge Brammertz).
29. International Independent Investigation Commission, Sixth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), UN Doc. S/2006/962 (December 12, 2006)
(prepared by Serge Brammertz).
30. International Independent Investigation Commission, Seventh report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005) and 1686 (2006), UN Doc. S/2007/150 (March 15,
2007) (prepared by Serge Brammertz).
31. International Independent Investigation Commission, Eighth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007), UN Doc. S/2007/424
(July 12, 2007) (prepared by Serge Brammertz).
32. International Independent Investigation Commission, Ninth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission, which was prepared pursuant to Security Council
resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007), UN Doc.
S/2007/684 (November 28, 2007) (prepared by Serge Brammertz).
5

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
33. International Independent Investigation Commission, Tenth report of the International
Independent Investigation Commission, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595
(2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007), UN Doc. S/2008/210
(March 28, 2008) (prepared by D.A. Bellemare).
United Nations Resolutions
34. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994).
35. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).
36. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
37. S.C. Res.1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
38. S.C. Res. 1595, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr.7, 2005).
39. S.C. Res. 1664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
40. S.C. Res.1748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1748 (Mar. 27, 2007).
41. S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007)
Treaties
42. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, September
14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S 10106.
43. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16,1970, 860
U.N.T.S. 12325.
44. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
September 23,1971, 974 U.N.T.S 14118.
45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, December 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 15410.
46. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, December 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 21931.
47. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, October 26, 1979, 1456 U.N.T.S.
24631.
48. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
6

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, February 24,
1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. A-1418.
49. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, March 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 29004.
50. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, March 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 29004.
51. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, March 1,
1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 36984.
52. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, December 15, 1997,
2149 U.N.T.S. 37517.
53. The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, April 22, 1998,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3de5e4984.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
54. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism, July 1, 1999, http://www.oicun.org/print.php?item_id=&sec_id=38 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2010
55. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, December 9,
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270.
56. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, April 13, 2005,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-15.pdf (last visited April 14, 2010)
Newspaper Articles
57. The Daily Star Online Edition Staff, Lebanese minister Marwan Hamade wounded in
Beirut Blast, The Daily Star, Oct. 4, 2005,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=8912.

7

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
I.
A.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

Issue

This memorandum examines whether terrorism has been adequately defined as an
international crime for which individual non-state actors may be held liable.* The basic tenets of
the definition are set by general treaties while special limitations have been formed by regularly
voiced objections during treaty negotiations, regional treaties embodying these objections, and
state practice.1 Although terrorism and certain terrorist acts are criminalized by treaty the
definition of terrorism itself solely exists under Customary International Law.
B.

Summary of Conclusions
1.

Terrorism is a Crime Under International Law

Historically, at the international level, terrorism has been dealt with as a list of
prohibited acts that have been codified in multiple treaties rather than as a generic crime
with a general definition.2 The recent conventions on suppressing terrorist bombings and
the financing of terrorism, along with the affirmation of these conventions by the Security
Council, have forced countries to address terrorism as a broader crime. The plethora of
international and regional agreements on terrorism, combined with the Security Council’s
involvement and existing General Assembly declarations, reflect a consensus that terrorism
Is Terrorism a crime under International Law? If so, what is its definition?
Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 163 (2nd ed. Oxford University Press 2008). [Reproduced in
accompanying sourcebook at tab 18] Cassesse argues that the wide acceptance of treaties addressing terrorism
represents a general sense of the international community that terrorism is an international crime. State practice, in
the form of domestic laws that contain similar definitions of terrorism, has led to a customary definition of terrorism
as a crime during peace time. The disagreements over the definition of terrorism relate only to exceptions to what
should be considered terrorism for legal purposes and not a complete rejection to the notion of terrorism as a
customary international crime.
2 Ben Saul, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Oxford University Press 2006). [Reproduced in
accompanying sourcebook at tab 19] Saul notes that “much of the physical conduct comprising terrorist acts has
been criminalized under international treaties, and some terrorist acts may also qualify as other international crimes
(such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or torture) if the elements of those crimes are present.”
*

1
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is in fact a discrete international crime. Although there are continuing disputes on what
constitutes the crime of terrorism, there is an agreement based on the overlapping
definitions that apply to the specific situation of a peace-time act with transnational links
outside the bounds of a struggle for national liberation.
2.

Customary International Definition of the Crime of Terrorism

A limited definition of terrorism has emerged under Customary International Law
for terrorist acts that occur in peacetime outside the bounds of a struggle for national
liberation. Terrorism involves non-state actors causing or threatening to cause death or
serious bodily harm to noncombatant civilians, or causing property damage significant
enough to cause serious economic harm, through a criminal act, that is not a political crime,
with an intent to coerce a political change by the fear of such acts provided the act has a
transnational character by virtue of the nationality of the victims, the nationality of the
perpetrators, or the location of the act.
II.

Factual Background
A.

The Assassination

Rafik Hariri, a former Prime Minister of Lebanon, was assassinated in a massive
explosion that killed him and 21 others in central Beirut on February 14, 2005.3 More than
220 were injured and damage to the surrounding buildings was extensive.4
Prior to the Hariri assassination, there was an attempt on the life of former
Economy and Trade Minister Marwan Hamadeh, who had resigned to protest the role of

3

International Independent Investigation Commission, Report of the International Independent Investigation
Commission established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595, ¶¶ 36-37 UN Doc. S/2005/662 (October 19,
2005) (prepared by Detlev Mehlis). [hereinafter UNIIC I] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 24]
4 Id. ¶ 141.
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Syria in Lebanon.5 In March of 2005 there were three more bombings in Beirut that killed
three people and wounded twenty. Throughout the summer of 2005 there were ten more
bombing attacks primarily in the vicinity of Beirut. Among the dead were journalist Samir
Kassir and former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party George Hawi. News anchor
May Chidiac and the then current Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr, part of the newly
elected majority anti-Syrian governing coalition, were both wounded in subsequent
explosions.6
B.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon

As a result of the large scale of the attacks and the potential for internal politics to
influence the outcome of the investigation, Lebanese authorities requested outside
assistance to ensure the process would be fair and complete. Initially a United Nations
Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIC) was tasked by the Security Council to assist
the Lebanese authorities in investigating February 14 “terrorist attack”7 in order to
discover the how it was carried out and who was responsible.8 The mandate for UNIIC
included determining the link between the February 14 attack and the other bombings in
The Daily Star Online Edition Staff, Lebanese minister Marwan Hamade wounded in Beirut Blast, The Daily
Star, Oct. 4, 2005, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=8912. Mr.
Hamade had recently resigned from his position in the Lebanese Cabinet in protest of Syria’s domination of
Lebanon. [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 57]
6 UNIIC I, supra at 8-9. This is the timeline of events surrounding the Hariri assassination as determined by
the commission. Of note is the breakdown of relations between prominent Lebanese politicians and the
Syrian government, which was followed by a series of bombings that appeared to target these politicians and
sympathetic activists.
7 Id. ¶ 1. The Commission opened its first report by stating its mandate to “assist the Lebanese authorities in
their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in order to, among other things, help identify its
perpetrators, sponsors, organizers, and accomplices.” The Commission specifically refers to the bombing as a
terrorist act and implies that culpability lies with all who played a role in plotting and perpetrating the
assassination.
8 S.C. Res. 1595, ¶ ¶ 1,3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr.7, 2005). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab
38] This resolution is the source of the Commission’s investigatory mandate as quoted in note 7. The Commission
was to have full access to all evidence and information collected by Lebanese investigators as of the time of its
formation. It also had the authority to collect new evidence and interview anyone of interest within Lebanon.
5
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Lebanon around that time. Ultimately, in order to ensure that the criminal investigation
would result in a just and transparent judicial process, pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1664, a “tribunal of an international character based on the highest
international standards of criminal justice,”9 designated the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
was established with the following subject matter jurisdiction:
The Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack
of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. If the Tribunal finds that other
attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005,
or any later date decided by the Parties and with the consent of the Security Council,
are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a
nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005, it shall also have
jurisdiction over persons responsible for such attacks. This connection includes but
is not limited to a combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive),
the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the
attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators.10
The Tribunal has great leeway in determining the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction
based on how liberally it chooses to find connections between other attacks that occurred
in Lebanon during the October 1, 2004 through December 12, 2005 time period of its
mandate. Building on the concept of the Hariri assassination as a terrorist act,11 the
Tribunal’s mission is to try those involved in what the Security Council, Secretary General,
and Lebanese investigators agree to have been terrorist campaign.12

9

S.C. Res. 1664, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 39]
The Security Council specifically charged the Secretary General of the United Nations to negotiated with the
Lebanese Government so as to form what would become the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
10 S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment 1, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). [Reproduced in accompanying
sourcebook at tab 41] The subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is limited to “
11 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 1. See note 7.
12 Cassesse, supra at 166. Terrorists have both the objective intent to commit a criminal act and the
subjective intent that the criminal act have a desired coercive effect. The Tribunal’s analysis of both motive,
the objective intent, and the purpose behind such attacks, the subjective intent, is strongly suggestive of the
Security Council granting the criminal tribunal jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism rather than just the
objective crimes of the bombings.
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C.

The Suspects

Shortly after the Febuary 14 bombing, the Nasra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria
called the Director of Al Jazeera Television in Beirut to claim credit for the attack.13
However, investigation into this group and the caller suggests that the group does not exist
and that the caller was a decoy meant to mislead potential inquiries into the bombing.14
The Commission had no evidence to dispute the assumption that the motive for
assassinating Rafik Harari was to deter anti-Syrian political activity within Lebanon.15
Rather than being the act of a lone bomber or small extremist element, the Commission
believed the assassination was the work of a large and well-resourced group.16 Individuals
of both Syrian and Lebanese origin with strong ties to the Syrian Intelligence agencies were
the primary suspects.17 Now that suspects have been identified, the Tribunal must decide
precisely how to charge them.18
It must be noted that the assassination and the other potentially associated
bombings were outside the bounds of an armed conflict. There is no claim that these
attacks were part of a struggle for national liberation, though it is likely that motive was
political.19

Those who were targeted and killed were civilians. The suspects comprise a

group of both Syrian and Lebanese nationals.

UNIIC I, supra ¶ 38.
UNIIC I, supra ¶ 186.
15 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 94.
16 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 215.
17 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 216.
18 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 223.
19 UNIIC I, supra ¶ 217.
13
14
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III.

Substantive Legal Definitions of Terrorism
A.

Terrorism as a Trans-National Crime: Prohibited Acts

While there is no substantive definition of terrorism in general, there is a large body
of treaty law which addresses specific criminalize acts that are intended to collectively
address many of the common means of terrorism. The current collection of sectoral
treaties share the common traits of prohibiting a specific act, the prohibited act must be
criminalized under domestic law, the state must create specific rules on jurisdiction over
the crime, a requirement to either prosecute individuals accused of the prohibited act or
extradite them to the accusing nation with acknowledgment that terrorism is not a political
crime even if politically motivated, and the conventions set specific rules on international
cooperation.20 An initially narrow set of obligations has evolved into a broader, though not
yet comprehensive, web of laws that is meant to suppress terrorism by offering it no legal
shelter in an state.
1.

Terrorism Defined by Specific Acts: The Sectoral Framework for
Addressing Terrorism

The early sectoral counterterrorism treaties were very narrow in their definition of
the actions being criminalized and a state’s obligation to assume jurisdiction over the
enumerated crime. It was a reaction to specific attacks by non-state actors in the 1960’s
against the budding international commercial aviation industry inspired the first treaties
John P. Grant, Beyond the Montreal Convention, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 453, 456-459, (2004). [Reproduced
in accompanying sourcebook at tab 6] The requirement to either extradite an alleged offender found in a state’s
territory or report them to that state’s prosecutorial authority creates what is functionally a regime of universal
jurisdiction over those suspected of committing terrorist acts as defined by a treaty. However, there is no actual
requirement that a state prosecute terrorism suspect that it chooses not to extradite. The requirement is only that the
suspect be reported to a prosecuting authority that will then determine whether or not to move forward with criminal
proceedings.
20
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addressing terrorism.21 The first such convention, the Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), did not once use the term
“terrorism.” Instead it simply applies “in respect of offences committed or acts done by a
person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting state, while the aircraft is in
flight.”22 The convention further defines when states may exercise jurisdiction over offense
committed on board the aircraft23 but does not include a duty to prosecute or extradite.24
This Tokyo Convention established the basic principle common to terrorism treaties that
ensures a relatively uniform system of domestic laws criminalizing a specific disruptive act
of a generally transnational nature. While the Tokyo Convention encouraged states to
individually address the phenomena of attacks on commercial aviation, it only created a
reporting requirement between states in custody of an accused offender and the state of
which he accused in a national.
The sectoral treaties gradually became more expansive in order to improve
coordination among states and limit an offender’s freedom of movement. The 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft again avoided the term
terrorism but it did continue the trend of universalizing the laws against an enumerated
21

Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 196 (3rd ed. Routledge-Cavendish 2003)
[Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 16] The treaty regime for terrorism has been reactionary in a
nature. Beginning with attacks on aviation, specific acts that outraged the international community were
codified as international crimes. These thematic treaties have built upon each other to create a more
complete legal regime, but the treaty law alone is not comprehensive in its approach to terrorism.
22 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Art 1. September 14, 1963, 704
U.N.T.S 10106. [hereinafter Tokyo Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 42] Article 1
enumerates the offences as offences against penal law or an “act which, whether or not they are offences, may
or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order
and discipline on board.”
23 Id. at Art. 4.
24 Id. at Art. 13. A contracting State that receives an accused offender is obligated to hold the individual in
custody according to its current laws. Art. 13 ¶ 5 requires the contracting State to conduct an inquiry into the
facts and to notify the state of the aircrafts registration and the state of which the accused is a national
whether or not the custodian state will be exercising criminal jurisdiction.
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terrorist act.25 This agreement mandated that each state be able to assume jurisdiction
over acts of violence against passengers or crew aboard aircraft in three specific
situations.26 Furthermore, the Hague Convention requires that the enumerated offenses be
extraditable crimes in all Contracting States27 and the Contracting States “afford one
another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings”
brought under the Convention.28 Inherent to the Hague Conventions improvements on the
Tokyo Conventions limited provisions for international cooperation is the understanding
that the crimes comprising terrorism are international in nature and necessitate a
coordinated international legal response.
The key element in universalizing the criminalization of a given terrorist act is to
demand at least a minimum amount of enforcement of the legal norm. While it broadened
the list of prohibited acts against civil aviation,29 the Montreal Convention for the

25

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Art. 2, December 16,1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 12325.
[hereinafter Hague Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 43] Each party to the Hague
Convention must undertake to make the offense of unlawfully seizing an aircraft punishable by severe
penalties. Parties must universally criminalize the acts enumerated by this convention.
26 Id. At Art 4: Article 4 defines the three situations in which parties be able to assume jurisdiction over acts of
violence against the crew or passengers aboard an aircraft are: a) When the offence is committed on board an
aircraft registered in the State; b) When the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its
territory with the alleged offender still on board; c) When the offence is committed on board an aircraft
leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of
business, his permanent residence, in that State.
27 Id. at Art. 8. As a means of deterring the unlawful seizure of aircraft, the Hague Convention goes beyond just
requiring that states which have an extradition treaties with one another add the convention’s enumerated offenses to
the list of extraditable crimes. The Hague Convention also gives states which do not have extradition treaties—
states that would otherwise require such an agreement in order to extradite a suspect—the option of considering the
Hague Convention as an extradition treaty between all parties with respect to all crimes that fall under the treaty’s
purview.
28 Id. at Art. 10. This provision is meant to increase the level of cooperation that may already exist between
states. There is an obligation for states with no other agreement between one another regarding criminal
matters to cooperate on proceedings under the convention. This provision does not affect pre-existing
agreements between states regarding cooperation on criminal enforcement matters.
29 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Art. 1, September 23,1971,
974 U.N.T.S 14118. [hereinafter Montreal Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 44]
The Montreal Convention opens as follows:
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Suppression of the Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation went one step further
by requiring that Contracting States either extradite accused offenders or prosecute
them.30 These baseline requirements—that the enumerated acts be criminalized in all
party states, that the party state creates jurisdiction over the acts in specified situations,
that the enumerated acts be extraditable offenses, and that party states must either
prosecute or extradite accused offenders—are present in all of the later sector terrorism
treaties31 with the caveat here that the accused shall not be extradited if the offense is

Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to
endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of
flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable
of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any such act is
likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an
aircraft in flight.
2. Any person also commits an offence if he:
(a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence.
30 Id. at Art 7. If the state does not extradite the suspect, the suspect’s case must be submitted to a competent
criminal prosecution body within that state. The convention sets a standard of treatment for the suspect’s
case as that which would be afforded a serious criminal matter. However, if the prosecuting body meets this
loosely defined standard, it may choose not to prosecute and the state will still have discharged its duties
under the Montreal Convention. See also Grant, supra.
31 The following is a list of the sectoral terrorism treaties [All Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tabs
42-52, 55-56]:
1. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Tokyo on September 14,
1963;
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23
September 1971;
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973;
5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 17 December 1979;
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980;
7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
done at Montreal on 24 February 1988;

16

Avrum Jacobson
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2010
being used as a pretext to prosecute the accused for a political offense.32 The legal
framework that evolved for attacks on aviation served as model for prohibiting terrorist
acts in general.
2.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings: A Terrorist Act’s Defining Features

Until relatively recently the international legal regime failed to clearly distinguish
what elevated an underlying crime into a terrorist act beyond the act having become the
subject of a sectoral treaty. The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, of particular relevance to the investigation into the 2005 bombings in
Lebanon, addressed this thematic gap. Although the treaties addressing attacks on civil
aviation, airports, maritime traffic and facilities, the taking of hostages, the protection of
nuclear material, and marking of plastic explosives all ostensibly addressed terrorist acts,33
the Bombing convention is the first convention that specifically used the word “terrorist” in

8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome
on 10 March 1988;
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988;
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, done at Montreal on March 1,
1991;
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 15 December 1997;
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on 9 December 1999; and
13. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on April 13, 2005.
32
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Art. 9, December 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 21931.
[Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 46] States may refuse extradition if there is a belief that the
extradition request is a pretext for prosecuting the suspect based on race, religion, ethnic origin, or political opinion
rather than the crimes of hostage taking enumerated in the convention. The extradition provisions in the Convention
Against Taking Hostages do not modify preexisting extradition agreements between parties.
33
Saul, supra at 130. The sectoral treaties address conduct that is widely considered as terrorist in nature.
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the title.34 In addition to the standard legal obligations upon party states,35 the Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings creates a framework for defining terrorism by
specifying what type of bombing would qualify as a terrorist bombing as follows:
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an
explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system,
where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence
as set forth in paragraph 1.
3. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2; or
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2;
or
(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set
forth in paragraph 1 or 2 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such
contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.36
The elements that distinguish a terrorist bombing from a non-terrorist bombing are the
choice of target and the specific intent to cause serious death or injury or major economic
loss. A terrorist bombing, for international criminal purposes under the treaty, is further
limited to an act of a transnational nature where the accused and all of the victims are not

34

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Preamble, December 15, 1997, 2149
U.N.T.S. 37517. [hereinafter Bombing Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 52] The
preamble to the Bombing Convention specifically declares that an expansion of the multilateral counterterrorism
regime is needed in order to prevent terrorism in general and to punish terrorists. A terrorist bombing is simply the
manifestation of terrorism that is being directly addressed in the convention.
35 Bombing Convention, supra at Art. 6-9. Article 6 imposes a duty on parties to the convention to ensure
domestic laws allow for jurisdiction over the crime of terrorist bombing. Article 7 establishes the duty to
investigate the suspect for potential prosecution or extradition and a duty to inform other parties to the
convention of its findings. Article 8 contains the requirement the parties to the convention either extradite
suspects or to submit the case to appropriate domestic authorities for potential prosecution. Article 9
ensures that the crime of terrorist bombing is an extraditable offense in all state parties to the convention.
36 Bombing Convention, supra at Art. 2.
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all nationals of the same state.37 This convention also carves out two caveats that are
common to formal agreements regarding terrorism; the convention does not affect other
international legal obligations upon states and individuals to include international
humanitarian law; and the convention does not apply to military forces in their official
capacity in as much as they are subject to existing international laws.38 The Bombing
Convention laid the thematic foundation for defining terrorism under current treaty law.
3.

Financing Treaty: Addressing Terrorism in General

Applying the themes of the Bombing Convention to terrorism in general enables a
more cohesive approach to suppressing terrorism by identifying the specific crime being
addressed outside the limited context of the initial definition by example approach of the
sectoral treaties. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
International Terrorism differs from prior agreements on terrorist acts by setting
guidelines for what is included under the rubric of terrorism in general.39 In addition to

Bombing Convention, supra at Art. 3. The convention “does not apply where the offense is committed
within a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is
found in the territory of that State, and no other state” has a claim to jurisdiction under the convention.
38 Bombing Convention, supra at Art. 19. Article 19 specifically states that “the activities of armed forced
during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are
governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of
a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international
law, are not governed by this Convention.”
39
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Art. 2, December 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M.
270. [hereinafter Financing Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 55] Article 2 states that:
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means,
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the
annex; or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act.
37
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incorporating the acts prohibited under the prior sectoral treaties,40 a key principle agreed
upon in this treaty is the dual mens rea nature of terrorism. Terrorism as a crime has a
dual intent requirement: there must be the intent to commit the prohibited act and the
specific intent that the act have a terrorizing or coercive effect.41 An accused Terrorist
must possess the specific intent to commit the underlying crime as defined in either an
existing sectoral treaty or involving a threatened or actual act of violence against a
protected person under the treaty regime. The accused must also have the intent that the
act influences a government or international organization to act in a specific way. Through
the incorporation of prior treaties, it can be assumed the Financing Convention’s definition
of terrorism includes the military exclusion of the Bombing Convention. Similarly, the
Financing Convention must therefore not affect obligations that exist under international
humanitarian law, which suggests that it only applies when the acts in question do not

Financing Convention, supra at Annex. The annex lists the following treaties as addressing acts being
incorporated into the convention’s definition of terrorism:
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970.
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23
September 1971.
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973.
4. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 17 December 1979.
5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980.
6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
done at Montreal on 24 February 1988.
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome
on 10 March 1988.
8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988.
9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 15 December 1997.
41 Cassese, supra at 168. A terrorist must have intent to commit a criminal offence and the specific intent that
the criminal act will have the effect of compelling a prominent private or public body to act in a desired way.
Robbing a bank and taking hostages with the sole intent of making money would not qualify as terrorism
because the coercive effect is only intended for private, rather than ideological or political, gain.
40
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qualify for prosecution as war crimes or crimes against humanity. The definitional
provisions of the Financing Treaty implicitly carve out terrorism as a discrete international
crime.
B.

Terrorism as a Discrete International Crime Rather Than Subset
of International Humanitarian Law or Human Rights Law

Although under the sectoral treaties alone, terrorism initially developed as more of
a transnational crime than a broad international crime,42 the evolution of the treaty regime
corresponded to a growing acceptance of terrorism as an international crime. The sectoral
treaties all mandate that the prohibited acts be criminalized under the domestic law of
party nations but the early conventions did not establish universal jurisdiction over
offenders until much later.43 In the 1994, when the later sectoral treaties with greater
thematic scope were being negotiated, the United Nations General Assembly specifically
condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable.44
Although the General Assembly’s resolution is not binding in and of itself, it is a
proclamation by member nations of a customary understanding of terrorism as a crime.
42

Bruce Broomhall, State Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism From a Human Rights Perspective, 36
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 421, 424-425, (2004). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 2] Individual
responsibility under the sectoral treaties arises primarily under national law.
43 See Tokyo Convention, supra at Art. 3-4. Jurisdiction under the Tokyo Convention was limited to state of
registration of the aircraft on which the act was committed or if the state had a direct connection to the
perpetrator, the victims, or the effects of the act. This is in contrast to later treaties such as the Financing
Convention, supra at Art. 9, where any state party may exercise jurisdiction over one suspected of financing
terrorism that is found in its territory.
44 G.A. Res. 49/60, Annex Art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). [hereinafter Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 34] This resolution contains
the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. In addition to declaring that “acts, methods, and
practices of terrorism” may threaten international peace and security, it also puts forward the following definition of
terrorism:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to
justify them.
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While it was accepted that terrorism, in any form, constitutes a crime, there was still
a question of whether terrorism is a discrete crime or a special subset of other
international criminal doctrines. Attempts to treat terrorism as a subset of crimes against
humanity require either a very liberal definition of crimes against humanity or only can
apply to widespread terrorist campaigns.45 Terrorist acts are often typified by
indiscriminate attacks and choices of targets that are protected by the Geneva Conventions,
which may allow international humanitarian law to address the issue directly rather than
requiring a new legal regime for terrorism.46 However, individual acts and even a series of
acts such as occurred in Lebanon in 2005, may be universally recognizable as terrorism
without necessarily rising to the level of a widespread attack as in a crime against
humanity.47
Furthermore, the application of a war crimes doctrine to terrorism may give greater
clarity to counterterrorist forces but it also expands the legal rights and freedom for
terrorists to act. The laws of armed conflict do prohibit acts that are often committed by

45

Sébastien Jodoin, Terrorism as a War Crime, 7 International Criminal Law Review 77, 79 (2007). [Reproduced
in accompanying sourcebook at tab 8] Attempts to include terrorism as a crime against humanity generally reflect
the political desire to strongly condemn terrorism rather than a cohesive legal argument that connects terrorism to
the specific requirements of a crime against humanity. Theoretically an act of terrorism could contain the
constitutive elements of a crime against humanity, but that is not the norm.
46 Id. At 81. International Humanitarian Law already prohibits unnecessary harm to non-combatants or their
property. Of note though is that similar to war crimes that constitute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, the treaty regime for criminalizing terrorism requires states to prosecute or extradite suspected
terrorists.
47 Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its
Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23, 28 (2006). [Reproduced in
accompanying sourcebook at tab 15] Widespread terrorism campaigns such as those of aircraft hijackings in the
1960’s and hostage taking in the 1970’s were addressed with specific treaties rather than as crimes against humanity.
See also Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes and International Co-Operation: Critical Remarks on the Definition
and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes, 19 European Journal of International Law 533,
569 (2008). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 4] The typical manifestations of terrorisms could
only meet the criteria of crimes against humanity if the scope of a widespread or systematic attack is interpreted
liberally.
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terrorists, but they also provide a legal legitimacy for terrorist attacks on military forces
and government institutions and offer the defense of obedience to orders for individual
terrorists.48 The potential benefit of treating terrorism as a war crime outside the bounds
of an armed conflict would be to incentivize terrorist groups to minimize attacks on civilian
populations by following the laws of armed conflict. The criminal nature of terrorism
suggests that this would be unlikely. Rather, terrorist groups would be given new rights
and defenses while the counter-terrorist would receive little in return.49
In contrast to the dual mens rea requirement of terrorism the emerged from the
sectoral treaites, the international humanitarian law definition of terrorism does not
require any special motive beyond the intent to terrorize the population.50 However, the
application of the Geneva Conventions and additional Protocols is limited to armed conflict,
occupation, and wars of national liberation.51 Additionally, the war crimes regime is
focused primarily on the actions of states and can only apply to non-state actors in the

Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects,
36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 359, 373 (2004). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 11] Treating
terrorism as a peacetime equivalent of war crimes would give terrorists the full range of protections afforded
combatants under international humanitarian law. Furthermore, granting terrorists the standing of
combatants may grant them greater legitimacy and permit them to attack government personnel and
facilities because such actions do not traditionally qualify as war crimes.
49 Scharf, supra at 374. The greater leeway afforded the state in countering terrorism by treating terrorists as
combatants may not overcome the risks posed by the greater rights afforded to terrorists under this
approach.
50 Jodoin, supra at 97. International humanitarian law prohibits the intentional use of terrorizing tactics
against civilians in order to mitigate suffering caused by the conduct of armed conflict. Culpability is based on
the effect of causing unnecessary terror and not on any secondary motive of ideological coercion.
51 Jodoin, supra at , 88. Although the definition of armed conflict is very broad, it still only encompasses
actions between states. Not state actors may be held liable under the Geneva Conventions in the limited cases
where they are resisting an occupation or fighting for national liberation against colonial or racist regimes.
However, there law regarding who may exercise the right to violently fight for self-determination is not yet
clear.
48
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limited cases of foreign occupation or national libration struggles.52 In contrast to
international humanitarian law, the crime terrorism as understood by the sectoral treaties
and emerging custom specifically addresses the behavior of non-state actors and
individuals outside of armed conflicts.
Terrorism as a tactic, rather than a distinct crime, can fall under war crimes law
when the acts in question are committed by combatants during an armed conflict. Isolated
acts, however, that undisputedly fall under the rubric of terrorism such as the 2004
bombing of trains in Madrid, Spain or the 2005 bombings of the public transport system in
London do not necessarily fall under International Humanitarian Law or Crimes Against
Humanity as traditionally understood. The widespread legal condemnation of terrorism
and selected terrorist acts in treaties, United Nations Security Council resolutions, and
domestic law reflects the emergence of terrorism as a discrete crime in customary
international law.53
C.

United Nations Resolutions Adopt Sectoral Treaty Obligations

The sectoral treaties were initially only binding upon party states and their each
state had freedom in crafting its own implementing legislation and reasonable standards of
compliance, but the Security Council has begun imposing the treaty obligations on all states
and intervening to set standards of compliance. In response to the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, an act attributed to Libyan agents, United Nations
Jodoin, supra at 89. The requirements under the Geneva Conventions and associated Protocols that the
conflict not be sporadic, that the non-state fighters control territory, and that they resemble a traditional
military in their organization all limit their application to a war crime of terrorism for non-state actors.
53 Id. at 569. Terrorism is a candidate for becoming a fully fledged discrete crime under and emerging
customary law. See also Young, supra at 102. A customary rule based on the overlap in the various
definitions of terrorism in international instruments and national laws may be crystallized through state
action.
52
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Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) demanded that Libya renounce terrorism.54
Although terrorism was not defined in the text of the resolution, it does clarify that the
prohibited acts identified in the conventions, such as violence against civil aviation under
the Montreal Convention, are explicitly acts of terrorism under international law. The
Security Council also defined for Libya how it was to meet the goal of extradite or
prosecute as established by the Montreal Convention. The Security Council’s intervention
in the prosecution of the Lockerbie bombers clarified the role of the sectoral treaties in
creating a framework for terrorism in general under international law and the duty of all
states to ensure terrorism is punished.
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, the Security
Council imposed a broad counterterrorism regime upon all states, thereby identifying
terrorism as a discrete crime under international law and not only for nations that were
parties to the sectoral treaties. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
effectively legislated the requirements of the Financing of Terrorism Convention as binding
on all member states and created jurisdiction in each member state.55 Although the
Security Council initially declined to define the crime ofterrorism,56 the language of United

Grant, supra at 468. This is the first time that the Security Council used its authority to order a member
state to surrender its nationals for trial abroad on terrorism charges. See also S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 35] The Security Council
specifically invoked its Chapter VII authority to order compliance with sanctions on Libya until it met the
demands of the United States, United Kingdom, and France for the surrender of the suspects in the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103.
55 S.C. Res. 1373, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at
tab 36] This resolution declares that states shall prevent and suppress the financing of international
terrorism. Additionally, state shall criminalize the financing of international terrorism and the supporting of
those who finance international terrorism.
56 Young, supra at 42. The Security Council used language more reminiscent of legislation by issuing
mandatory directions rather than urging or calling upon nations to act. However, many states had already
accepted the obligations of Security Council Resolution 1373 by ratifying the Financing Convention and
54
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) offers a de facto, if not intended dejure,
definition of terrorism.57 The resolution:
Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if
not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with
their grave nature…58
Even if this language is not considered a definition of terrorism in and of itself, the
reference to the definitions of existing treaties indicates that Terrorism can be defined at
the very least as the aggregate of existing treaty definitions.
D.

Thematic Agreement but Conflicting Definitions

Despite agreement on common themes that identify terrorism as a crime, there is no
single universally accepted definition of terrorism. This inability to forge a formal
agreement on the definition of terrorism transcends disciplinary boundaries.59 Within the

accepting the standards of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. However, a specific
definition of terrorism is specifically lacking in Resolution 1373, which may lead to differing results in how
states that are not party to the Financing Convention, with its associated definition, implement this
requirement in their domestic laws.
57 Young, supra at 45. While Resolution 1566 may not have been intended as containing a legal definition of
terrorism, it is likely to represent the understanding the intended meaning of terrorism by the Security
Council. Additionally, this definition, by referencing the existing international conventions on terrorism,
suggests that terrorism may also be defined as the sum of the existing treaty definitions.
58 S.C. Res.1566, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 37]
59 Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 375, 378 (2004). [Reproduced in
accompanying sourcebook at tab 12] A rudimentary internet search for a definition of terrorism yields over two
million hits, many of which conflict with each other. Even experts note a lack of precision in many definitions of
the concept of terrorism.
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academic arenas of the social sciences an analysis of commonly accepted factors has led to
the following proposed consensus definition of terrorism:
an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)
clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political
reasons, whereby -- in contrast to assassination -- the direct targets of violence are
not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization),
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily
sought.60
While comprehensive and possibly suitable for academic discourse, it does not address the
exception raised by states for struggles of national liberation61 or distinguish between state
and non-state actors. An acceptable definition of the crime of terrorism must not only
address common agreed upon themes but also persistent assertions of that which does not
constitute terrorism.
Ironically, it is the very difficult process of trying and failing to negotiate a definition
of the crime of terrorism that has allowed the common themes and persistent objections to
crystallize. Throughout the 1970’s, as the first conventions regarding terrorist acts came in
to force, NGOs and government delegations alike agreed on the lack of an acceptable
definition for terrorism.62 Scholars often point to the existence of nineteen different
definitions of terrorism in use by the various agencies of the United States Government and
Id. at 382.
Id. At 388. Negotiations on a compromise definition of terrorism for the proposed Comprehensive
Convention Against International Terrorism broke down the lack of an exception for national liberation
movements fighting foreign occupations.
62 Jodoin, supra at 80. The International Committee for the Red Cross found that terrorism has no legally
acceptable definition in 1971. Similarly, the American Representative to the 1974-1977 Geneva Diplomatic
Conference decried the lack of a satisfactory definition of terrorism.
60
61
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multiple statutory definitions of terrorism in order to demonstrate the lack of a consensus
on the legal definition of terrorism.63 However, the great similarities between these
various definitions indicate a core on which there is general agreement.64
1.

United Nations General Assembly Declaration

The United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
Terrorism of 1994, while not binding on nations as law, is representative what the majority
of the General Assembly understands to be the definition of terrorism. The declarative
effect of this measure is strengthened by its repeated reaffirmation by consensus in
subsequent years.65 The definition provided by the General Assembly is “criminal acts
intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons
or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any
other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”66 Similarly, the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on Terrorism’s draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism suggested:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
63

Mohammed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism in the Muslim World: A Middle Eastern
Perspective, 36 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 221, 248 (2008). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 7]
The United States government uses nineteen different definitions of terrorism and each agency charged with
a counterterrorism mission uses a different definition of terrorism. See also Schmid, supra at 377. The
United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the United States State
Department, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Defense
all use distinctly different definitions of terrorism. Of note is that these definitions differ on whether
terrorism is limited to the targeting of non-combatants.
64 Young, supra at 33. A definition of terrorism is emerging from the conventions and resolutions that address
the issue. The definitions all have a common foundation of the use of violence to coerce a desired change. A
consensus is emerging even without a specifically agreed upon definition.
65 Young, supra at 40. The Declaration’s persuasive power as evidence of the opinion of states in increased by
its annual endorsements in subsequent resolutions.
66 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, supra at ¶ 3.
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(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure
facility or the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b)
of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose
of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.67
This proposal also met objections for not carving out an exception for acts in a struggle for
national liberation. Nor does it address the exclusion in the bombing convention for
military forces acting in an official capacity, though the military exclusion does not apply to
acts that qualify as international crimes.68 However, there were no objections to the
individual criminal culpability of those accused of terrorist acts. It must be noted that
Article 2 of the Financing convention contains very similar language to the working group’s
proposal.69 Furthermore, the United National Security Council Resolution 1373 made the
substantive requirements of the Financing convention binding on all nations, though it did
not explicitly endorse the included definition of terrorism until United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1566.
2.

Regional Definitions of Terrorism by Persistent Objectors

The definitions of terrorism in regional instruments by countries that have often
resisted comprehensive approaches to terrorism is indicative of what is an acceptable
U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 166, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of
the Working Group, 16, Art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9 (October 29, 2001) (prepared by Rohan Perera).
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee Report] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 23]
68 Broomhall, supra at 438-439. Analysis of the military exemption to the Bombing Convention, see Bombing
Convention, supra Art. 1, 19, shows that it does not create exemptions for the police, intelligence, or internal
security forces of a state. Even for military forces, there is a growing trend to not recognize international
crimes as ever being an official duty and therefore the commission of international crimes would subject
otherwise exempt officials to criminal liability.
69 Schmid, supra at 390. Agreement on a definition is more a political and semantic issue than a true legal
problem. Despite the failure of to negotiate a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism due to
an inability to agree on a definition, the existing definition implied in the Financing Convention is similar to
the rejected compromise proposal.
67
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universal definition of the crime of terrorism. Of note is the Convention of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, which contains an explicit
definition of terrorism similar to those put forward by the Security Council and General
Assembly. This treaty’s definition:
Terrorism means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives
or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with
the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives,
honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or
public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering
a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial
integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.70
The OIC convention maintains the struggle of national liberation exclusion to the definition
of terrorism that has held up agreement71 on a substantive international definition—
“Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression,
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with
the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”72 The Arab
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism puts forward a similar definition.73 Additionally,
Islamic Law mirrors the international list of prohibited acts through the protection of
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Art. 1, July
1, 1999, http://www.oicun.org/print.php?item_id=&sec_id=38 (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). [hereinafter OIC
Convention] [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 54]
71 Young, supra at 38. There were attempts to create an exemption to the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages for hostage taking in the context of national liberation movements.
72 OIC Convention, supra Art. 2.
73 The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Art. 1-2, April 22, 1998,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3de5e4984.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) [Reproduced in accompanying
sourcebook at tab 53] The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism defines the crime of terrorism in Art.1
as “Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual
or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing
their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private
installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources.” This
definition is subject to an exception in Art. 2 for “All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed
struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the
principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence. This provision shall not apply to any act
prejudicing the territorial integrity of any Arab State.”
70
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diplomats, limitations on the taking of hostages, and the sacredness of human life and real
and personal property.74 International Covenants of Muslim countries are not only
binding international law but incorporated into Sharia.75 Notwithstanding the failure to
date for all states to agree on a codified definition of terrorism, most states have committed
to very similar definitions with consistent and recognizable areas of disagreement.
E. Emerging Peacetime Consensus
The overlap in international instruments and substantive law represents the
customary definition of terrorism in international law.76 The United Nations High Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to the General Assembly treated the
language in the Financing Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566
as definitional.77 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 has also provided the
framework of a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute bringing the defined crime
Terrorism under the court’s jurisdiction.78 However, proposals for putting terrorism under

Hassanien, supra at 234-235. Respect for the universality of humanity is a central tenet of Islam and a
foundation for the legal system. Therefore respect for life and property are fundamental principles of Islamic
law. Therefore Islamic law imposes many of the same restrictions on collateral damage that are imposed by
the secular international legal regime.
75 Hassanien, supra at 231. Islamic law requires that Muslims honor their contract commitments. Entering
into an international covenant such as a treaty is creates not only a binding international legal requirement
but a binding religious legal requirement. A violation of the treaty would be a violation of religious law.
76 Young, supra at 33. The core definition of terrorism is a product of the overlap of treaty requirements and
recurrent themes in international statements and declarations about terrorism. Despite the political
compromises inherent in treaty negotiations, there are enough common elements to reflect a consensus on
legal concepts that define terrorism.
77 Id. at 42. The report concluded that the definitions within the Financing Convention and Security Council
Resolution 1566 should be starting points for negotiating a comprehensive definition of terrorism.
78 Coalition of Victims of Terrorism in the Basque Country, Terrorism, International Crime: Proposed Amendment
for the International Criminal Court’s Review Conference, 8, 2009,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/TERRORISM_INTERNATIONAL_CRIME_COVITE.pdf.
[Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 22] The proposed amendment to the Rome Statute was
based on Security Council Resolution 1566 because its prior adoption by the Security Council led to the
expectation that the language would therefore be acceptable to all parties. This is reflective of the de facto
definitional power of Resolution 1566.
74
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the International Criminal Court’s purview foundered on the lack of a single substantive
definition from the United Nations.79 While a specific agreement on a unified definition of
terrorism is lacking, common themes exist across all proposed international definitions.80
1.

Definitional Themes of Terrorism

While a substantive definition of the crime of terrorism is lacking, a definition built
on the agreed upon elements of terrorism can be constructed. Dissecting the various
meanings of terrorism and rebuilding a definition from the common elements and
consistent objections is an approach to finding the area of consensus for the definition of
terrorism.81 The customary definition of Terrorism is based on the themes that are
repeated throughout the substantive law, domestic laws, and declarations.82 The emerging

Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Report on the Eighth Session on the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute, 11, January 2010, http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/CICC__ASP_8_Report.pdf. [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 21] Although many delegations approve
in theory of including terrorism as crime under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, it was voted down because
most delegations believed the existence of an accepted legal definition of terrorism under the auspices of the
United Nations is a precondition for inclusion of terrorism as a crime under the Rome Statute.
80 Cyrille Begorre-Bret, Symposium: Terrorism, Globalization, and the Rule of Law: The Definition of Terrorism
and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987, 1995 (2006). [Reproduced in accompanying source
book at tab 1] A focus on basic tenants reveals general agreement on the components of a definition for the
crime of terrorism. All attempts to define terrorism involve violence or potential violence, a secondary
political motive in addition to the basic criminal motive, and the ultimate goal of coercing a targeted
population to act in desired manner out of fear primarily through the targeting civilians.
81 Schmid, supra at 407. A consensus definition may be found by ranking the themes that are most common
to definitions of terrorism and the themes that are least common. The result is a definition that explicitly
states what the consensus is regarding the definition of terrorism.
82 Young, supra at 53-64. There are nine common themes that emerge when comparing the definitions of
international terrorism in existing instruments. These key provisions are the actual or potential causing of
death or serious harm to non-combatant civilians, the criminal status of the underlying act, an intent to
coerce, the range of victims includes persons and property, the perpetrator has secondary political motive,
there is a transnational element to the act, the perpetrators are non-state actors, and terrorism is not a
political crime despite its political motive. See also Schmid, supra at 403-404, proposing list of the ten
common elements to all definitions of terrorism:
1. The demonstrative use of violence against human beings;
2. The (conditional) threat of (more) violence;
3. The deliberate production of terror/fear in a target group;
4. The targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents;
5. The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda;
6. The fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of conflict waging;
79
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custom does not include violence as part of a struggle for national liberation, although acts
that constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity can be punished as such.83
2.

Definition of the Crime of Terrorism

Terrorism is an independent international crime in peacetime on which the
following consensus is has emerged:
terrorism consists of (i) acts normally criminalized under any national penal system,
or assistance in the commission of such acts whenever they are performed in time of
peace; those acts must be (ii) intended to provoke a state of terror in the population
or to coerce a state or an international organization to take some sort of action; and
finally (iii) are politically or ideologically motivated; that is, are not based on the
pursuit of private ends.84
When an act prohibited by a terrorism convention is committed but the actor lacks the
specific intent or has a solely personal intent then it is not terrorism although it is criminal
act subject to other legal provisions.85 Terrorism as a crime is distinguished by motive.86
Building on the foundation of the sectoral treaties, terrorism is crime committed by
individual non-state actors. As demonstrated by negotiating histories and regional treaties,
the consensus on terrorism does not address acts that occur in the context of struggles for
national liberation. The international consensus reflects a customary definition of the
7. The importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences;
8. The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence;
9. The predominantly political character of the act;
10. Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public.
83 Di Filipo, supra at 565. Terrorism as a discrete crime is only justifiable to condemn acts over which no
other international crime applies.
84 Cassese, supra at 165.
85 Cassese, supra at 170. The sectoral treaties all demand criminalization of the underlying terrorist act as the
basis for attaching criminal liability. The political intent behind the crime is what raises the act to the level of
terrorism from mere common criminality, but a terrorist motive in and of itself is not a crime absent the
commission of an actual crime.
86 William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 90, (3rd ed. Cambridge
University Press 2007). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 20] Terrorism is defined more by
motive than by the underlying criminal act. This complicates the definitional process because traditionally
crimes are defined by prohibited conduct.
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crime of terrorism involving non-state actors causing or threatening to cause death or
serious bodily harm to noncombatant civilians, or causing property damage significant
enough to cause serious economic harm, through a criminal act, that is not a political crime,
with an intent to coerce a political change by the fear of such acts provided the act has a
transnational character by virtue of the nationality of the victims, the nationality of the
perpetrators, or the location of the act.
IV.

Theories of Culpability
A.

Individual Responsibility

The customary international crime of terrorism imposes liability on the individual
as a non-state actor that commits the offense. Beginning with the Tokyo Convention, the
sectoral treaties place criminal liability on a person committing the proscribed act.87 This
approach continued through the Financing Convention,88 and was later adopted by the
United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in its proposed comprehensive definition
of terrorism.89 Individual liability is a consistent and undisputed element of the accepted
definitions of terrorism.
B.

Command Responsibility

The customary definition of terrorism, built on the foundation of the sectoral
treaties, allows for liability under the doctrine of command responsibility. The Financing
Convention specifically allows for command responsibility liability by holding an individual

Tokyo Convention, supra Art. 1. The scope of the convention is defined in the context of “offenses
committed or acts done by a person.”
88 Financing Convention, supra Art. 2. See note 39.
89 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra at 16. The proposed definition of terrorism opens with “any person
commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention,” establishing it as a crime of individual liability.
87
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liable if “organizes or directs others to commit an offence”90 otherwise proscribed by the
treaty. Command Responsibility as crime of accomplice liability is long standing principle
of customary international law.91 In the most common applications of this doctrine, an
individual can be held liable under the doctrine of Command Responsibility, holding the
commander liable for the same crimes as the subordinate, for war crimes and crimes
against humanity92 but the doctrine is applicable to all manner of criminal acts by
subordinates.93
The most comprehensive commentary on the doctrine of Command Responsibility
has emerged from the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.94 The International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia has found that superiors, for purposes of Command
Responsibility, includes civilians in positions of authority.95 De facto command is

Financing Convention, supra Art 2. See note 39 for text of Art. 2 ¶ 3(b).
Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence
of the Superior, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 619, 621-624 (2007). [Reproduced in accompanying
sourcebook at tab 10] Historically commanders were held directly responsible for the crimes of subordinates
as the commander had actually committed the crime. The underlying theory has evolved to understand
command responsibility as form of participation through accomplice liability.
92 Id. at 624. This theory was affirmed by a panel of experts convened by the United Nations to study the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
93 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 75, 120-121 (2005).
[Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 3] The doctrine of command responsibility can hold military and
civilian leaders liable for the crimes of their subordinates. There are two forms of liability. The first form of
command responsibility liability is when the leader actively directs subordinates to commit a crime. The second,
and more commonly adjudicated, form of liability arises indirectly when a leader fails to take appropriate action to
prevent or punish crimes that the leader did know about or should have known about.
94 Matthew Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 Lieden Journal of International Law
139, 158-159, (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 9] The key elements of command
responsibility are that a commander knew or should have known that a subordinate had committed or was
going to commit a prohibited act and that the commander failed to punish it or failed to prevent it. These
elements are consistent with international jurisprudence dating back to World War II and have been
extensively adjudicated in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
95 Id. at 159. A superior may be any government official capable of exercising control over subordinates that
is analogous to the level of control expected of a military leader.
90
91
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sufficient.96 While a state may be held liable for the crimes of private actors such as nonstate terrorists under the customary doctrine of principle-agent liability,97 applying the
doctrine of command responsibility to the leadership decisions that led the state facing
liability may enable holding individual officials liable. Command responsibility prevents
government officials from using the protection of their official duties to commit
international crimes.
C. Joint Criminal Enterprise
The focus on preventing support to terrorists by both treaties and the Security
Council invites the application of joint criminal enterprise liability to the international
crime of terrorism. The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise emerged from the
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.98 Liability under joint
criminal enterprise requires the intent to support the criminal purpose of the joint

Id. at 162. A superior must take all possible action to prevent war crimes. Even absent formal authority,
the ability to exercise control imposes a duty to punish or prevent the crimes of subordinates that the
superior knows about or should know about.
97 Tal Becker, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 78, (Hart Publishing
2006). [Reproduced in accompanying sourcebook at tab 17] The four principles of the agency paradigm are:
1. The acts or omissions of a State’s organs and agents are acts of the State for which the State may be held
legally liable;
2. The acts or omissions of private actors will be regarded as acts of the State if the private actors are de facto
agents by virtue of operating on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the State;
3. The acts or omissions of private actors will be regarded as acts of the State if, in clear and unequivocal
terms, the State adopts the private conduct as its own; and
4. In all other circumstances, the acts or omissions of private actors are not acts of the State and the State will
not be held responsible for them. However, the State may be responsible for its own acts or omissions in
relation to that private conduct where it is subject to a separate legal obligation to prevent, punish, or
otherwise regulate that conduct.
98 Danner & Martinez, supra at 103-106. Joint criminal enterprise as currently understood emerged from the
first trial of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. The court’s jurisprudence has suggested three
categories of liability. In the first category, the offenders acted as part of a common design with a common
criminal intent. The second category applies primarily to systematic behaviors such as running concentration
camps. The most liberally defined and controversial category of joint criminal enterprise imposes liability on
an individual associated with others who committed a crime when that individual did not intend that those
crimes be committed provided that those crimes were foreseeable.
96
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enterprise.99 A liberal application of the joint criminal enterprise liability is justifiable
when chaotic circumstances and decentralized command prevents more rigorous and
detailed prosecution.100
V.

Conclusion
Terrorism is crime under international law. Multiple treaties have enumerated

specific terrorist acts that are prohibited. The Security Council has passed numerous
resolutions mandating the criminalization of terrorism. The General Assembly has
repeatedly affirmed that terrorism is an unjustifiable crime. However, none of these
sources specifically defines terrorism with the precision necessary to charge an individual
with the crime of terrorism per se as opposed to charging an individual with a specific
offense that is recognized to be terrorist in nature.
Ironically it has been the contentious international debate over codifying a
definition of terrorism that has yielded a precise customary definition of the crime of
terrorism. The vigorous and consistent voicing of objections to various proposals has
created a definition of terrorism under customary international law that combines the
elements of definition of terrorism from the Financing Convention with restrictions to
1.

99

Catherine H. Gibson, Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine in
the ICTY: A Comparison of Individual Liability for Group Conduct in International and
Domestic Law, 8 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 521, 528 (2008). [Reproduced in
accompanying sourcebook at tab 5] An individual can be liable under the third category of
joint criminal enterprise if it possessed the intent to participate in and support the criminal
enterprise and the commission of other crimes by other members of the enterprise outside the
scope of the enterprise’s common criminal purpose was a foreseeable result.
100Id.

at 547. The decentralization of the Yugoslav conflict and the difficulty in gathering evidence
combined with a mandate to punish past crimes justifies a broad application of the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise.
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which no nation has voiced disagreement: Terrorism involves non-state actors not
involved in a struggle for national liberation that cause or threaten to cause death or bodily
harm to noncombatant civilians, or causing property damage significant enough to cause
serious economic harm through a criminal act, that is not a political crime, with an intent to
coerce a political change by the fear of such acts.
Although the crime of terrorism as understood in Customary International Law
applies to individuals as non-state actors, existing authority under the Terrorism treaties,
UN Security Council Resolutions and state practice provide a basis for holding state agents
who acted in an official capacity to be held liable for their role in terrorist attacks. Rules of
command responsibility apply.
Charges of terrorism may apply in the case of the bombing attacks that killed former
Lebanese Prime-Minister Rafik Harriri. The attack was a terrorist bombing as defined
under the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and therefore a
specifically criminalized act. The attacks did cause death and serious bodily harm.
Individual suspects of both Lebanese and Syrian Nationality have been identified. It is
reasonable to suspect that the targeting of a vocal critic of Syria’s role in Lebanon was
intended to coerce a political change that quashed the debate on Syria within Lebanon.
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